Financial markets in time of stress by Reinhart, Carmen & Kaminsky, Graciela
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Financial markets in time of stress
Carmen Reinhart and Graciela Kaminsky
University of Maryland, College Park, Department of Economics
December 2002
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13869/
MPRA Paper No. 13869, posted 9. March 2009 16:16 UTC
 
 
 
Financial Markets in Times of Stress 
Graciela L. Kaminsky 
George Washington University 
Carmen M. Reinhart* 
International Monetary Fund 
First draft: January, 25, 2000 
This draft: June 27, 2002. A revised version 
of this paper was published in: 
Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 69 No. 2, December 2002, 451-470.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this paper, we examine which markets are most synchronized internationally and 
exhibit the greater extent of comovement.  We focus on daily data for four asset markets: bonds, 
equities, foreign exchange, and domestic money market. Our sample covers thirty-five developed 
and emerging market countries during 1997-1999. The extent of comovement and responsiveness 
to external shocks is examined in different ways.  To measure the response of these markets to 
adverse external shocks, we date the peaks in domestic interest rates and bond spreads and the 
largest daily declines in equity prices and assess the extent of clustering around the same period. 
 We also analyze which markets show evidence of greatest comovement in general, irrespective 
of whether there are adverse shocks or not.  
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 I.  Introduction 
Much has been written about globalization and the greater degree of capital market 
integration in the past decade.  One strand in this vast literature has developed a variety of 
approaches to test for the extent of capital mobility.1  Another rapidly-growing branch has 
attempted to document the incidence of contagion, spillovers, or international propagation of 
shocks.  Often, these studies focussed on the cross-country correlations of asset returns.2  
                                                           
1 See, for instance, Frankel (1992) and Obstfeld (1995). 
2 See Dornbusch, Park, and Claessens (2000), for a recent survey. 
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However, most of this literature has paid little attention to the probable case that not all 
asset markets are likely to be affected by external shocks in the same manner or equally 
integrated internationally.3 4  Such differentiation in the sensitivity to external shocks or the 
extent of global integration may arise for several reasons.  For instance, Reinhart and Reinhart 
(1999) provide a simple model where investors have perfect access to the international bond 
market but bank customers do not.  They show that if depositors have access to international 
capital markets interest rates on deposits will co-move with the international interest rates on 
bonds, but if borrowers cannot borrow from abroad, lending rates of interest need not covary 
with the international interest rates on bonds.5 Similarly, if a government allows its bonds to be 
freely traded internationally but has restrictions on the foreign ownership of equities, one would 
expect that bond yields would be more responsive to external shocks than equity returns.  
However, market segmentation of these types will not be the only reason why some asset 
markets may be more sensitive to external shocks than others.  While a variety of narratives 
describing episodes of contagion suggest that speculative attacks on currencies are bunched 
together across countries, the heterogeneity in exchange rate arrangements and monetary policy 
across countries would suggest that exchange rates and the Αpolicy≅ domestic interest rate are 
likely to show less covariation across countries than an internationally traded sovereign bond or 
                                                           
3 External shocks may take the form of a rise in international interest rates, an oil shock, or a financial 
crisis in another country. 
4 An exception is Hausman and Rigobon (2000). 
5 Obviously, the opposite is true if borrowers are the ones with access to international capital markets, 
while depositors do not. 
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equity.6  Foreign investors may play a more prominent role in some markets (i.e., the market for 
sovereign bonds) which may increase the degree of comovement across countries, since the same 
decision makers are involved. Along the same lines, equity price indices may have a markedly 
different industry composition across countries, which may act to dampen comovement with 
equity markets across international borders.  In other words, the domestic idiosyncratic 
component in some asset markets is greater than in others.   
In this paper, we examine which markets are most synchronized internationally and 
exhibit the greater extent of comovement.  We focus on daily data for four asset markets: bonds, 
equities, foreign exchange, and domestic money market. Our sample covers thirty-five 
developed and emerging market countries during 1997-1999. The extent of comovement and 
responsiveness to external shocks is examined in different ways.  First, to measure the response 
of these markets to adverse external shocks, we date the peaks in domestic interest rates and 
bond spreads and the largest daily declines in equity prices and assess the extent of clustering 
around the same period.  Second, we conduct principal component analysis over the entire 
sample to analyze which markets show evidence of greatest comovement in general, irrespective 
of whether there are adverse shocks or not.7  
                                                           
6 One example is Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995), which analyzes of Europe=s Exchange 
Rate Mechanism crisis. 
7 In the working paper version of this paper, we look for volatility spillovers, working with the 
simplest of the generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) models to 
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examine whether there was a marked change in volatility much along the lines of Edwards (1998) and 
Edwards and Susmel (2000) and (2001). 
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In the next section, we describe and date the various episodes of regional or global 
financial turmoil that we study and provide some background on the international setting during 
our sample period.  In Section III, we compare the extent of comovement across countries and 
the profile of daily volatility in four asset markets--bond, equity, foreign exchange, and domestic 
money market. Concluding remarks, sprinkled with some policy implications, are presented in 
Section IV. 
 
 II.  Episodes and Background 
In what follows, we turn our attention to some of the events or Αshocks≅ that have 
shaped financial markets in recent years; all these episodes are likely to be familiar to the reader, 
as these have received considerable attention in the financial press.  
1.  Asset markets 
Shocks may be confined to a single market, such as equities, or may have more far-
reaching consequences, simultaneously affecting foreign exchange, domestic money, and the 
international bond markets.  Most often, when a country is mired in a deep financial crisis, all 
markets are affected; the currency weakens, domestic interest rates rise as expectations are 
unsettled (this may be compounded if the monetary authorities tighten policy to restore 
credibility), the terms of borrowing in international capital markets (assuming access is not lost 
altogether) deteriorates, and other asset prices (i.e., equity and real estate) slide.  Volatility 
increases across the board. Milder periods of turbulence, owing to external developments, may 
not have such widespread effects.  For instance, the period of financial market turbulence around 
October 27-28, 1997, was nearly global in scope but was largely confined to equity markets.  In 
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the analysis that follows, we will pay particular attention to how the spread of disturbances 
across countries differs among the four asset markets we study. 
2.  Events 
Table 1 presents a brief chronology of significant events during the January 1, 1997-
August 31, 1999 period.  The list is not meant to be exhaustive, rather it highlights some of the 
key episodes we analyze.8  In the remainder of this paper, our focus is primarily on four events.  
In chronological order, they are: the devaluation of the Thai baht on July 2, 1997; the Russian 
devaluation and default on August 17, 1998; the September 1-2, 1998 stint, during which 
Malaysia introduced fairly drastic capital control measures (on September 1st) and LTCM issued 
a letter to its shareholders revealing its precarious condition (on September 2nd); and the 
recapitalization of LTCM that began on September 23rd, 1998. 
While these events are a focal point of our study, there are other episodes that are 
encompassed in our analysis. These include: the crash of the U.S. equity market and the 
speculative attack on Hong Kong on October 28, 1997; the evolution of the Korean crisis 
following the devaluation of the won on November 17, 1997; the closure of Solomon Brothers= 
bond arbitrage desk on July 6, 1998; the first Wall Street Journal article on the profit pressures 
on LTCM on July 20, 1998; the inter-FOMC meeting reduction in U.S. interest rates on October 
15, 1998; and the Brazilian devaluation on January 13, 1999, which also coincided with rumors 
                                                           
8 For a more comprehensive chronology of the events surrounding the Asian crisis the reader is 
referred to Nouriel Roubini=s home page; for a more detailed listing of significant events in the fall of 
1998, see Bank of International Settlements (1999); and for a more extensive chronology of capital 
controls see Edison and Reinhart (2001). 
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about a possible debt crisis in China. 
3.  Data and sample 
Our data is daily and spans the period beginning on January 1, 1997 through August 31, 
1999.  Because of the daily frequency of the data, the variables we analyze are confined to  
financial markets.  Specifically, these variables are:  the domestic overnight interbank interest 
rates (whenever possible); the daily return on equities in the local currency taken from local 
bourse indices;9 the percent change in the daily exchange rate versus the dollar or versus the 
deutschemark (DM);10  and, the interest rate spreads on bonds that capture the Αpricing of risk≅. 
 For the industrial countries, the interest rate spread is between corporate and sovereign bonds, 
while for emerging markets the spread is between a sovereign bond and a comparable United 
States Treasury security. As regards sovereign bonds, we have tried to use the most liquid of 
these, since bonds that are infrequently traded are not likely to reflect short term shifts in market 
sentiment.  The particulars for all the data used for the thirty-five countries in our sample are 
provided, along with their respective sources, in the Data Appendix. 
The countries in our sample cover more of the mature-to-emerging-market range of 
experiences.  Countries with less developed capital markets and a significant extent of financial 
repression are not a part of this study, as the focus rests on high-frequency capital market 
developments.  We can classify the sample into five, somewhat arbitrary, seven-country 
                                                           
9 More precisely, returns are defined as the percent change in equity prices, as dividend data is not 
available on a daily frequency. 
10 For all the countries the exchange rate is bilateral against the U.S. dollar.  The exceptions are 
Estonia and the European countries, for which bilateral exchange rates versus the DM are used. The 
exchange rate is expressed as number of local currency units per dollar or DM; hence, and increase 
denotes a depreciation. After January 1, 1999, DM quotes are based on a strict translation from euros. 
 
 8 
groupings: The G-7 countries, which are comprised of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
United Kingdom, and the United States; and the transition economies, which include Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Russia, and the Ukraine.  The remaining three 
groups are primarily by region.  There is the Asian cluster, which includes Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand.  The other 
European group, which excludes those countries that are part of the G7, and includes, Finland, 
Greece, Holland, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the non-European Turkey.  Finally, the Latin 
American sample consists of the larger economies in the region, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. 
4.  The international setting 
Tables 2 and 3 present a broad brush view of the key variables during three sub-periods 
in our sample: the period in between the devaluation of the Thai baht and that of the Russian 
ruble; the couple of weeks in between the Russian devaluation and the introduction of capital 
controls in Malaysia, which occurs a day before LTCM issued a letter to its shareholders; and the 
stretch between that day and the relatively rare interim easing of monetary policy in the United 
States.  Table 2 presents the cumulative change in the variables of interest, which simply 
compares the end point to the first observation of the sample.  Hence, for example, interest rates 
were roughly the same on August 17, 1998 as they were on July 1, 1997 for the G7 and the Latin 
American economies, although, rates were higher for the Asian and transition economies (7.09 
and 13.14 percent, respectively.) Since the first sub-sample covers a much longer period, Table 3 
presents the same data for daily changes at a monthly rate.11 So, for instance, during the first sub-
                                                           
11 Specifically, the change reported in Table 3 divided by the number of days in the subsample raised 
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sample, interest rates rose (on average) by 0.69 percent per month for the transition economies, 
but the increase was close to zero for the G7 countries.   
The three subsamples are quite distinct from one another.  Prior to the Russian crisis, 
Asian exchange rates had depreciated markedly against the US dollar--largely owing to the 
collapse of the Indonesian rupiah.  Asian equity prices fell 56 percent, while the terms at which 
they could borrow in international capital markets deteriorated, as reflected in the widening of 
bond spreads of 354 basis points.  Over this period, other emerging markets also experienced 
declining asset prices, despite relatively stable exchange rates and interest rates.  For the Latin 
American group, equity prices fell 32 percent, as equity markets in the region fell across the 
board.12  More surprisingly, bond yield spreads widened 522 basis points--even more than for the 
Asian crisis countries.13  The widening in bond spreads is even more pronounced for the 
transition economies. However, this is largely owing to Russia. Equity markets were falling 
nearly everywhere for the transition group, with the exception of Hungary. By contrast, most 
European and G-7 equity markets had substantial rallies during this period, with notable 
exceptions being Japan (down 25 percent) and Norway (down 11 percent). 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
to 30 to present it as a monthly rate. 
12 The decline in equity prices was largest for Venezuela (56 percent) and smallest for Colombia (11 
percent). 
13 Again, the largest deterioration was for Venezuelan bonds, as the spread widened by 1,793 basis 
points. 
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Following the Russian devaluation and before the LTCM story entered the public 
domain, the picture changes markedly.14  Equity markets take a tumble everywhere, with the 
exceptions of South Korea and Russia, which begins to recover from its massive slide.  Latin 
American markets are particularly hard hit.  Bond spreads widen dramatically, especially for 
Latin American sovereign borrowers. For Russia, the spread widens to more than 6,300 basis 
points.  Bid-ask spreads on debt instruments also widen dramatically, reflecting the loss of 
market liquidity.  As the next section will illustrate in the context a simple model, this reflected 
several withdrawals from risk-taking.  Domestic interest rates in Latin America rise during this 
period, with Mexico and Peru posting the largest increases.  The higher interest rates during this 
period owe both to the loss of credibility many emerging markets suffered following the Russian 
default--in part on the reassessment of the likelihood of  bailouts by the International Monetary 
Fund--and to the use of tight-money policies by many emerging market central banks to defend 
exchange rates. 
What is striking about the last subsample, which are the six weeks preceding the Fed=s 
interest rate cut, is that emerging markets appeared to be recovering already from the Russian 
shock.  Interest rates had started to decline, particularly in Asia, while equity markets were 
recovering, especially in Malaysia and Thailand.  Bond spreads for Latin America had began to 
narrow (by about 289 basis points), although yields spreads remained well above pre-crisis 
levels. For industrial countries the picture is very different from the emerging markets, as equity 
markets continued to tumble and bond spreads widened further. 
                                                           
14 It is important to note that stories of LTCM=s financial difficulties were circulating as early as July 
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20. 
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This strikingly divergent performance between emerging and mature capital markets in 
this last period may owe to the fact that, during these weeks, there was much speculation in 
financial circles, as to whether there would be more LTCMs.  Hence, there was concern about 
the health of the financial centers, rather then the periphery.  By then, the periphery had already 
been hard hit and portfolio inflows of capital (bond and equity) had dramatically dried up.  This 
stands in contrast to the equity market booms most of the industrial countries were enjoying 
prior to the Russian/LTCM shock. 
 
 III.  International Comovement in Asset Markets: Some Evidence 
To begin our enquiry as to which asset markets show the greatest extent of comovement 
across countries, we examine some basic descriptive statistics. In particular, we compare the 
dates of maximum and minimum values during the full sample to those of the episodes we are 
interested in analyzing.  Many of the countries in our sample do not allow their currencies to 
float freely--even when they say they do.15  As a consequence, we focus in the overnight 
domestic interest rate, as the highest rates may be associated with speculative attacks on the 
foreign exchange market.  Table 4, which provides the dates of the maximum values, reveals 
that, for most of the Asian countries in our sample, interest rate peaks occur in the second half of 
1997 and into early 1998, a period of much turbulence in the region.16   August and September 
1998 also shows numerous entries, coinciding with the Russia/LTCM crises. 17  However, with 
                                                           
15 See Reinhart (2000) and Calvo and Reinhart (2002) on the pervasiveness of the Αfear of floating≅ 
across both industrial and emerging market countries. 
16  This issue will be discussed in more detail in the next section. 
17  When confronted with a common shock that affects the financial center (such as Russia and 
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only a couple of exceptions, peaks in domestic interest rates are not highly synchronized across 
countries.  This lower degree of comovement could owe to the heterogeneity across countries as 
regards what money market interest rates reflect or simply because monetary policy responses 
vary across countries. The global coordination of disturbances is far more evident in Tables 5 
and 6, which provide the dates of the largest daily equity market declines and the largest increase 
in the bond yield spread. These equity market crashes are overwhelmingly clustered on October 
27-28, 1997 and in the interval between the Russian devaluation and the Federal Reserve=s 
intermeeting interest rate cut. The bunching of disturbances across countries is even more 
evident in the bond spread data presented in Table 6.  With a few exceptions, the largest daily 
increases occur in the late summer and fall of 1998. 
On the basis of these simple observations, it would appear that the October 1997 
disturbance, while far-reaching in its global scope was, confined to equity markets, while the 
August-October 1998 disturbances extended to bond markets as well.  
1. Principal component analysis 
To assess more formally how the degree of comovement across countries in several 
financial variables  evolves over time and across regions, we applied principal component 
analysis to the financial time series data over the full sample, as well as several subsamples. 
We focus on four daily time series, the domestic policy interest rate, the return on equity, 
the change in the exchange rate (in percent), and the bond spreads, for thirty-four of the thirty- 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
LTCM), Αfear of floating≅ (if not an explicit peg) may also bring about a synchronized rise in 
domestic interest rates, as central banks tighten in an effort to cap the slide in the currency (see Calvo 
and Reinhart, 2002). 
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five countries in our.18  From these series, we constructed a smaller set of series, the principal 
components, that explain as much of the variance of the original series as possible.  The higher 
the degree of co-movement in the original series, the fewer the number of principal components 
needed to explain a large portion of the variance of the original series.  In case where the original 
series are identical (perfectly collinear), the first principal component would explain 100 percent 
of the variation in the original series.  Alternatively, if the series are orthogonal to one another, it 
would take as many principal components as there are series to explain all the variance in the 
original series.  In that case, no advantage would be gained by looking at common factors, as 
none exist. 
                                                           
18 Owing to limited data availability, Bulgaria is excluded from the sample. 
The procedure begins by standardizing the variables so that each series has a zero mean 
and a unit standard deviation.  This standardization ensures that all series receive equal treatment 
and the construction of the principal component indices is not influenced disproportionately by 
the series exhibiting the largest variation.  The correlation matrix of the standardized series is 
decomposed into its Eigen-vectors and the diagonal matrix of Eigen-values. 
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The Eigen-vectors are the loading factors, or weights, attached to each of the original 
series.  For a particular time-series, the higher the degree of comovement with other series the 
higher (in absolute value) its loading factor.  If a particular time series is uncorrelated with the 
remaining series included in the analysis, then its loading factor in the first principal component 
should be close to zero.  A priori, this is what we should expect to see for the time series of, say, 
a small country with a Αperfectly idiosyncratic≅ shock, or for a country which has binding 
capital controls.19 
The results are presented in Tables 7-8 for the four regional groupings and for the G-7 
countries.  The share of the variance of the original series (in this case equity returns) explained 
by the first principal component ranges from a low of  0.36 for the transition economies to a high 
of 0.57 percent for the European group--with the other groups falling in between.  These results 
are hardly surprising, in light of the lack of homogeneity in the Transition economies group 
relative to the higher degree of integration in Europe. 
Examining the factor loadings by region or group, the outcomes are equally intuitive. 
                                                           
19 As the controls insulate the country from external disturbances (see Edison and Reinhart, 2001). 
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Among the Asian countries in our sample (Japan excluded), South Korea has the lowest factor 
loading (0.24); this result is not surprising, given that its own financial crisis began months after 
the onset of turmoil in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines.20  Malaysia shows the 
next-to-least degree of comovement (the loading factor is 0.32)--then again, Malaysia had capital 
controls throughout the latter part of the sample.  Among the European grouping, the extent of 
comovement is the least for Turkey, which has unresolved chronic inflation problems, and 
Greece.  Among the G-7 countries, the patterns of comovement are also largely defined along 
regions.  The four European countries move in unison, the United States and Canada move in 
another block;21 and Japan shows the least comovement with the other G-7 countries.  
Turning to Latin America, comovement is strongest among the larger three--Argentina, 
Brazil and Mexico, and least for Colombia and Venezuela. These patterns of covariation are not 
unique to the 1997-1999 sample.  In the immediate aftermath of the Mexican crisis, when most 
Latin American equity markets posted substantial declines, Colombia=s equity market posted 
moderate gains.22  Lastly, comovement is strongest among the earlier reformers--Poland, the 
Czech Republic, and Hungary--and weakest the Republics of the former Soviet Union. 
Tables 7 and 8 also report, for comparison purposes, the results for interest rate changes 
and exchange rates.  As is evident for all the country groups, the extent of covariation is 
noticeably lower reaching 0.4 for any group=s exchange rates and interest rates. 
                                                           
20 See Kaminsky and Reinhart (2001) for an analysis of the interdependence of the Asian economies 
before and after the 1997 crisis. 
21  This is evident in the factor loadings of the second principal component, shown in the next 
column. 
22 See Calvo and Reinhart (1996) for an analysis of this episode. 
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2.  Conditional variances 
In this section, we work with the simplest of the generalized autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (GARCH) models to examine whether there was a marked change in volatility 
during and around the various episodes analyzed in the preceding section.23  To economize on 
space, we only summarize our findings, which are reported in greater detail in the working paper 
version of this paper. We consider the following models: 
                                                           
23 In all cases a GARCH (1, 1) model was estimated. 
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where stock returns are denoted by rt, in equation (1), and the random shock is denoted by ε.24  
In the variance equation, ω is the mean of the variance; the lag of the mean squared residual from 
the mean equation (i.e., ε2t-1 ) is the ARCH term and last period=s forecast variance (i.e., σ2t-1) is 
the GARCH term.  The number of autoregressive lags, k, was selected on a country-by-country 
basis using both the Akaike and Shwartz criteria; if these yielded different results as regards the 
optimal lag length, both models were estimated.  We also estimated a comparable model for the 
domestic interest rate and the change (in percent) of the exchange rate.  Periods of turbulence 
that are part of our sample of daily observations render the assumption of identically and 
independently distributed conditionally normal disturbances in the most basic GARCH model 
inadequate.25  Given the presence of heteroskedastic disturbances in our sample (i.e., the εs), we 
use the methods described in Bollersev and Woolridge (1992) to compute the Quasi-Maximum 
Likelihood covariances and standard errors. 
                                                           
24  More precisely, the variable in question is capital gains or losses, as there is no dividend data at a 
daily frequency. 
25 For a discussion of some of the implications of changes in the variance of economic fundamentals 
during crises periods in the analysis of the international transmission of shocks,   see Forbes and 
Rigobon (1998). 
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Before turning to a discussion of specific countries, however, there are some general 
patterns that emerge from the analysis of the conditional variance of equity returns for these 
thirty three countries that merit mention.26  Even without knowing what events transpired during 
the three years covered in our sample, the equity returns data reveal four periods of general 
market stress, as reflected in large-to-moderate spikes in the variance of equity returns.  Two 
periods stand out most clearly from a review of the figures: a marked period of turbulence at 
end-October-early November of 1997 in most of the equity markets in our sample--this episode 
was, for the most part, relatively short-lived; and a more severe and far more protracted bout of 
volatility that, for most countries, begins in August of 1998 and lasts through October of that 
year. 27  Indeed, in more than half of the countries in the sample the largest spikes in volatility 
were recorded in the late summer and fall of 1998 and, that in nineteen of the thirty-three 
countries, this period was associated with the most persistent bout of volatility in the sample. 
In addition to the two more obvious episodes of market volatility on a global scale, there 
are two periods of market stress which merit discussion.  The first of these occurs in early 1998, 
at the height of the Asian crisis and it engulfs all the Asian countries in our sample, including 
Japan.28   Indeed, for seven of the countries in our sample (all in Asia), this episode shows the 
most marked and persistent rise in equity market volatility.  The high volatility during this 
                                                           
26 The conditional variance of daily equity returns is plotted for each country in Appendix Figures 1-
18, and Tables 17-21 in the working paper version of this paper. 
27  The first of these episodes lines up with the equity market crash in New York and, particularly 
Hong Kong on October 28, 1997, while the second spans the Russian crisis-LTCM debacle. 
28 Korea=s devaluation of the won occurs on November 17 and their negotiations with the 
International Monetary Fund last into late December 1997-early January 1998.  Furthermore, during 
this period there are recurring rumors that China will devalue and set the stage for a new round of 
financial instability in the region. 
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period, however, is largely confined to Asia, as both mature and emerging markets elsewhere are 
relatively tranquil.  The other market turbulence episode revealed by this data occurs in January 
1999, and it is most evident in Latin America.  The equity markets of four countries in our 
sample (all in Latin America) record their largest spike in volatility in that month; the shock, 
however, seems to be relatively short-lived.  Several European and Transition economies= equity 
markets also show more moderate increases in volatility. This spike corresponds to both the 
Brazilian devaluation of the real and several market disruptions after the Chinese government 
refused to help foreign creditors of GITIC.  Fears of debt crisis in China also swept through 
Hong Kong at this time. 
As regards individual countries, it is worth noting that in some cases overlap with 
Αglobal events≅ may be more of a coincidence that the conditional variances reveal.  For 
example, as discussed earlier in the context of the principal component analysis, Colombia is a 
country whose equity market shows little comovement with the rest of Latin America or other 
equity markets.  Its deep financial crisis, which occurs shortly after the devaluation of the ruble, 
had little to do with Russia or LTCM--as it had been brewing for fundamental reasons for some 
time.  Similarly, the spike in interest rates in Greece following the equity market turbulence in 
end-October 1997, was owing to an attack on the drachma motivated by predominantly domestic 
considerations. Another feature of the conditional variances, which applies to several Αcrisis≅ 
countries, is that the conditional volatility of equity returns remains consistently higher in the 
post-crisis period.  This is most evident of Indonesia and South Korea, but it also applies to 
Colombia, the Philippines, and Thailand.  In sum, the analysis of the variance of equity prices 
provides additional support that disturbances have an important global dimension in the period 
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under scrutiny.  Far more so than what is observed in foreign exchange and money markets. 
 
 VI.  Concluding Comments  
This paper has presented evidence to suggest that there are important differences in the 
responsiveness to external shocks and, more broadly, in the extent of international 
synchronization across asset categories.  Hence, the implications that one can draw about the 
extent of globalization and the degree of capital market integration depends importantly on 
which is the market examined.  With the exception of the G-7, which includes heterogenous 
cycles among the United States and Canada, Europe, and Japan, bond yield spreads exhibit--by 
far--the highest degree of comovement both across countries for the entire sample and various 
subsamples.29  One can speculate that, given that these spreads are dominated by sovereign risk, 
they represent a more homogeneous asset class than the equity, currency and, money market 
counterparts--sovereign bonds may also have  a more common and homogenous foreign investor 
base.  A distant second in the extent of comovement in returns (again, the exception being the G-
7 group)  are equity markets; for the G-7 countries, however, equity markets are the most 
correlated of the four asset markets we examine.  Furthermore, in terms synchronicity, as 
measured by the overlap of dates in which the largest declines were observed, equity markets 
also show substantial responsiveness to external shocks. 
For nearly all the regions or country groupings, the exchange rate market, followed bonds 
and equities (in that order) as the most correlated across countries.  The policy interest rate, not 
surprisingly--given the heterogeneity across countries in monetary policy and the extent of 
                                                           
29  Not all of these are reported here, but the results are available from the authors upon request. 
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credibility--comes as a distant fourth in terms of international comovement.  Idiosyncratic 
domestic shocks appear to be the dominant factor in explaining their behavior. 
In sum, studying the extent of capital mobility and the impacts of external shocks has 
been most often too limited to focussing on a particular asset market.  Our results taken together 
suggest that even countries with little capital account restrictions may be subject to other forms 
of capital market segmentation.  Hence, the differences in the degree of capital mobility is 
something that not only needs to be understood across countries, but across markets in a 
particular country as well. 
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 Table 1. Selected Significant Events during 1997 and 1998 
 
 
Date 
 
Event 
 
July 2, 1997 
 
Devaluation of the Thai baht 
 
August 14, 1997 
 
Indonesia abandons the rupiah trading band 
 
October 28, 1997 
 
US and Hong Kong markets crash  
 
November 17, 1997 
 
Korea abandons its defense of the won 
 
July 6, 1998 
 
Salomon Brothers bond arbitrage desk disbanded 
 
July 20, 1998 
 
First Wall Street Journal headline on LTCM 
losses 
 
August 17, 1998 
 
Russian effective default and ruble devaluation 
 
September 1, 1998 
 
Malaysia introduces capital controls 
 
September 2, 1998 
 
LTCM shareholder letter issued 
 
September 23, 1998 
 
LTCM recapitalization 
 
October 15, 1998 
 
Inter-meeting Federal reserve rate cut 
 
January 10, 
 
Market disrupted after Chinese government 
refused to help foreign creditors of GITIC 
 
January 13 
 
Fears of debt crisis in China sweep through Hong 
Kong. 
Brazil devalues 
Sources: The authors and Bank for International Settlements, A Review of Financial Market Events in 
Autumn 1998, October 1999. 
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Table 2. Changes over Selected Periods in Domestic Interest Rates, Exchange Rates,  
 Stock Prices, and Bond Spreads 
(In percent) 
 
Regional Averages 1 
 
July 1, 1997 to August 
17, 1998 
 
August 17, 1998 to 
September 1, 1998 
 
September 1, 1998 to 
October 14, 1998 
 
 Cumulative Changes in Interest Rates 
 
Asia 
 
7.09 
 
-0.13 
 
-1.47 
 
Europe 
 
1.18 
 
0 
 
-0.13 
 
G-7 
 
0.11 
 
0.15 
 
-0.3 
 
Latin America 
 
0.95 
 
4.13 
 
-0.14 
 
Transition Economies 
 
13.14 
 
5.66 
 
-5.44 
 
 Cumulative Changes in Exchange Rates 
 
Asia 
 
100.87 
 
-3.66 
 
-5.06 
 
Europe 
 
13.35 
 
1.03 
 
3.11 
 
G-7 
 
6.29 
 
-1.55 
 
-3.04 
 
Latin America 
 
13.36 
 
2.69 
 
1.14 
 
Transition Economies 
 
7.71 
 
12.06 
 
8.66 
 
 Cumulative Changes in Stock Prices 
 
Asia 
 
-56.11 
 
-9.9 
 
20.05 
 
Europe 
 
37.46 
 
-14.02 
 
-11.72 
 
G-7 
 
23.04 
 
-9.29 
 
-5.56 
 
Latin America 
 
-32.16 
 
-20.03 
 
5.18 
 
Transition Economies 
 
-18.98 
 
-14.11 
 
-7.24 
 
 Cumulative Changes in Bond Spreads (in basis points) 
 
Asia 
 
353.58 
 
161.25 
 
45.17 
 
Europe 
 
10.64 
 
125.47 
 
1.48 
 
G-7 
 
15.39 
 
16.41 
 
18.24 
 
Latin America 
 
521.51 
 
668.98 
 
-289.14 
 
Transition Economies 
 
1000.34 
 
868.43 
 
137.25 
Note: Data sources are described in the Data Appendix. 
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Table 3. Average Daily Changes over Selected Periods in Interest Rates, Exchange Rates,  
Stock Prices, and Bond Spreads 
(In percent, monthly rates) 
 
Regional Averages 1 
 
July 1, 1997 to August 
17, 1998 
 
August 17, 1998 to 
September 1, 1998 
 
September 1, 1998 to 
October 14, 1998 
 
 Interest Rates 
 
Asia 
 
0.43 
 
-0.23 
 
-1 
 
Europe 
 
0.08 
 
0.01 
 
-0.09 
 
G-7 
 
0.01 
 
0.3 
 
-0.2 
 
Latin America 
 
0.06 
 
8.99 
 
-0.23 
 
Transition Economies 
 
0.69 
 
15.73 
 
-4.39 
 
  Exchange Rates 
 
Asia 
 
4.12 
 
-6.84 
 
-3.45 
 
Europe 
 
0.76 
 
2.08 
 
2.05 
 
G-7 
 
0.42 
 
-3.02 
 
-2.07 
 
Latin America 
 
0.9 
 
5.52 
 
0.74 
 
Transition Economies 
 
0.53 
 
32.58 
 
5.24 
 
 Stock Prices 
 
Asia 
 
-5.91 
 
-18.29 
 
12.73 
 
Europe 
 
2.19 
 
-25.89 
 
-8 
 
G-7 
 
1.32 
 
-17.58 
 
-3.77 
 
Latin America 
 
-2.91 
 
-35.9 
 
3.26 
 
Transition Economies 
 
-1.59 
 
-23.89 
 
-5.33 
 
Bond spreads (in basis points) 
 
Asia 
 
25.09 
 
326.93 
 
28.26 
 
Europe 
 
0.75 
 
258.38 
 
0.98 
 
G-7 
 
1.12 
 
32.87 
 
12.15 
 
Latin America 
 
36.73 
 
1412.36 
 
-197.67 
 
Transition Economies 
 
65.95 
 
1936.26 
 
88.82 
Note: Data sources are described in the Data Appendix. 
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 Table 4. Daily Overnight Interest Rate Peaks: January 1997-August 1999 
  
 
Month/Year 
 
Country/ Date 
 
Maximum value 
 
January, 1997 
 
Germany/ 1 
Hungary/ 15 
 
4.66 
28.10 
 
March, 1997 
 
United States/ 31 
 
7.07 
 
April, 1997 
 
Japan/ 1 
Finland/ 14 
 
0.617.49 
 
May, 1997 
 
Czech Republic/ 29 
 
168.76 
 
July, 1997 
 
Thailand/ 2 
Malaysia/ 11 
 
27.0 
35.0 
 
August, 1997 
 
Indonesia/ 20 
 
91.45 
 
October, 1997 
 
Philippines/ 7 
Greece/ 31 
 
102.63 
80.50 
 
November, 1997 
 
Argentina/ 4 
Brazil/ 14 
Poland/ 26 
 
13.50 
70.37 
27.09 
 
December, 1997 
 
Chile/ 04 
Korea/ 26 
 
 
35 
 
January, 1998 
 
Singapore/ 8 
 
17.50 
 
February, 1998 
 
Spain/ 23 
 
10.95 
 
March, 1998 
 
Estonia/ 2 
Holland/ 24 
 
17.22 
4.50 
 
April, 1998 
 
Turkey/ 8 
 
76.88 
 
May, 1998 
 
Sweden/ 29 
 
4.56 
 
June, 1998 
 
Venezuela/ 19 
Italy/ 30 
 
140.40 
8.00 
 
August, 1998 
 
Russia/ 18 
Norway/ 25 
Hong Kong/ 31 
Canada/ 31 
 
160.00 
10.00 
17.50 
5.85 
 
September, 1998 
 
Ukraine/ 9 
 Mexico/ 11 
Peru/ 24 
 
145.00 
40.0 
55.0 
 
October, 1998 
 
UK/ 06 
 
8.88 
Note: Data sources are described in the Data Appendix. 
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 Table 5. Largest Daily Stock Market Declines: January 1997-August 1999 
 
 
Month/Year 
 
Country 
 
Date 
 
Percent Change 
 
August, 1997 
 
Philippines 
 
8/28 
 
-9.3 
 
October, 1997 
 
Argentina 
Canada 
Mexico 
Peru 
US 
Germany 
Hong Kong 
Hungary 
Italy 
Poland 
Singapore 
 
10/27 
10/27 
10/27 
10/27 
10/27 
10/28 
10/28 
10/28 
10/28 
10/28 
10/28 
 
-13.7 
-6.2 
-13.3 
-7.3 
-6.9 
-8.0 
-11.6 
-16.4 
-6.2 
-9.8 
-9.2 
 
 
November, 1997 
 
Estonia 
Korea 
Japan 
 
11/10 
11/24 
11/25 
 
-19.4 
-11.0 
-5.1 
 
January, 1998 
 
Indonesia 
 
1/08 
 
-12.0 
 
February, 1998 
 
Thailand 
 
2/04 
 
-9.5 
 
August, 1998 
 
Greece 
Turkey 
Czech Republic 
 
8/27 
8/27 
8/27 
 
-7.7 
-13.1 
-6.8 
 
September, 1998 
 
Ukraine 
Malaysia 
Brazil 
 Chile 
Russia 
Norway 
France 
Holland 
 
9/02 
9/08 
9/10 
9/10 
9/15 
9/17 
9/17 
9/21 
 
-15.4 
-21.5 
-15.8 
-7.4 
-24.0 
-7.0 
-5.0 
-5.7 
 
October, 1998 
 
Finland 
Sweden 
 
10/08 
10/08 
 
-6.9 
-6.7 
 
December, 1998 
 
UK 
Venezuela 
 
12/01 
12/11 
 
-3.6 
-10.2 
 
January, 1999 
 
Spain 
Colombia 
 
1/13 
1/28 
 
-6.5 
-5.5 
Note: Data sources are described in the Data Appendix. 
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 Table 6. Daily  Peaks in Bond Spreads: January 1997-August 1999 
 (In basis points) 
 
 
Month/Year 
 
Country/Date 
 
Maximum value 
 
March, 1997 
 
Holland/ 25   
 
116.58 
 
January, 1998 
 
Hong Kong/ 12 
 
591.17 
 
August, 1998 
 
Argentina/  27 
Venezuela/ 27 
 
1525.32 
4097.92 
 
September, 1998 
 
Turkey/ 1 
Korea/ 4 
Brazil/  10 
Peru/ 10 
Mexico/  11 
Colombia/ 15 
Philippines/ 21 
 
1030.67 
964.30 
2120.99 
1090.24 
1598.93 
1090.24 
1231.03 
 
October, 1998 
 
Canada/ 5 
Hungary/ 5 
Indonesia/ 5 
Poland/ 5 
Singapore/ 5 
Sweden/ 6 
Greece/ 6 
Russia/ 8 
Finland/ 15 
Germany/ 15 
United States/ 15 
Thailand/ 28 
 
101.50 
192.79 
1843.30 
581.76 
3.36 
106.77 
56.20 
6819.17 
75.43 
62.00 
183.94 
92.85 
 
December, 1998 
 
Spain/ 1 
 
136.36 
 
January, 1999 
 
France/ 8 
United Kingdom/ 27 
 
37.00110.00 
 
August, 1999 
 
Italy/ 20 
Japan/ 20 
 
141.15 
71.00 
Note: Data sources are described in the Data Appendix. 
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 Table 7.    Principal Component Analysis: Daily Data, January 1, 1997-August, 1999 
  Factor Loadings by Region 
 
 
 
 
 
Factor loading in first principal component 
 
 
 
Overnight interest 
rates 
 
Stock returns 
 
Exchange rate 
changes 
 
Bond spreads 
 
Proportion of the variance explained by 
the first principal component: Asia 
 
0.17 
 
 0.46 
 
0.38 
 
0.71 
 
Hong Kong 
 
0.31 
 
0.43 
 
0.06 
 
n.a. 
 
Indonesia 
 
0.14 
 
0.38 
 
0.43 
 
0.5 
 
Malaysia 
 
-0.19 
 
0.32 
 
0.18 
 
n.a. 
 
Philippines 
 
-0.41 
 
0.38 
 
0.5 
 
0.57 
 
Singapore 
 
0.68 
 
0.47 
 
0.36 
 
n.a. 
 
South Korea 
 
0.42 
 
0.24 
 
0.47 
 
0.48 
 
Thailand 
 
0.2 
 
0.38 
 
0.43 
 
0.43 
 
Proportion of the variance explained by 
the first principal component: Europe  
 
0.16 
 
0.57 
 
0.32 
 
0.63 
 
Finland 
 
0.34 
 
0.44 
 
0.44 
 
0.55 
 
Greece 
 
-0.16 
 
0.22 
 
0.26 
 
n.a. 
 
Holland 
 
0.28 
 
0.44 
 
0.36 
 
n.a. 
 
Norway 
 
0 
 
0.4 
 
0.47 
 
n.a. 
 
Spain 
 
0.42 
 
0.41 
 
0.32 
 
0.36 
 
Sweden 
 
0 
 
0.44 
 
0.43 
 
0.51 
 
Turkey 
 
0.59 
 
0.2 
 
0.31 
 
0.55 
 
Proportion of the variance explained by 
the first principal component: G-7 
 
0.23 
 
 0.56 
 
0.31 
 
0.47 
 
Canada 
 
0.18 
 
0.36 
 
-0.01 
 
0.49 
 
France 
 
0.56 
 
0.45 
 
-0.31 
 
0.36 
 
Germany 
 
0.56 
 
0.42 
 
0.6 
 
0.3 
 
Italy 
 
0.47 
 
0.41 
 
-0.39 
 
0.16 
 
Japan 
 
0.1 
 
0.21 
 
0.4 
 
0.26 
 
United Kingdom 
 
-0.08 
 
0.43 
 
0.47 
 
0.45 
 
United States 
 
0.32 
 
0.31 
 
-- 
 
0.49 
Note: Data sources are described in the Data Appendix. 
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Table 8.  Principal Component Analysis: Daily Data, January 1, 1997-August, 1999 
 Factor Loadings by Region 
 
 
 
 
Factor loading in first principal component for:  
 
 
 
Changes in 
overnight 
interest rates 
 
Stock returns 
 
Exchange rate 
changes 
 
Bond spreads 
 
Proportion of the variance 
explained by the first principal 
component: Latin America 
 
0.27 
 
0.49 
 
0.2 
 
0.93 
 
Argentina 
 
-0.42 
 
0.46 
 
0.13 
 
0.41 
 
Brazil    
 
0.46 
 
0.45 
 
0.36 
 
0.41 
 
Chile 
 
n.a. 
 
0.4 
 
0.44 
 
n.a. 
 
Colombia 
 
0.59 
 
0.11 
 
0.39 
 
0.4 
 
Mexico    
 
0.09 
 
0.44 
 
0.59 
 
0.41 
 
Peru 
 
-0.53 
 
0.38 
 
0.39 
 
0.41 
 
Venezuela 
 
n.a. 
 
0.28 
 
0.04 
 
0.4 
 
Proportion of the variance 
explained by the first principal 
component: Transition  
 
0.22 
 
0.38 
 
0.28 
 
0.75 
 
Czech Republic 
 
0.58 
 
0.5 
 
0.6 
 
n.a. 
 
Estonia 
 
0.11 
 
0.26 
 
0.10. 
 
n.a. 
 
Hungary 
 
0.39 
 
0.54 
 
0.58 
 
0.59 
 
Poland 
 
-0.44 
 
0.51 
 
0.52 
 
0.6 
 
Russia 
 
-0.54 
 
0.34 
 
0.01 
 
0.44 
 
Ukraine 
 
0.14 
 
0.14 
 
-0.14 
 
n.a. 
Note: Data sources are described in the Data Appendix. 
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Data Appendix 
 
 Stock Market Indices 
 
Country Index  Source 
Argentina: Merval Index (local currency) BLOOMBERG 
Brazil: lBOV Index (local currency) BLOOMBERG 
Canada: TS300 Index (local currency) BLOOMBERG 
Chile: IPSA index (local currency) BLOOMBERG 
Colombia: COSMlBB Index (local currency) BLOOMBERG 
Czech Republic: PX50L Index (local currency) BLOOMBERG 
Estonia: TALSE Index (local currency) DOW JONES ONLINE 
Finland: HEX Index (local currency) BLOOMBERG 
France: SBF250 Index (local currency) BLOOMBERG 
Germany: DAXI Index (local currency) BLOOMBERG 
Greece: ASE Index (local currency) BLOOMBERG 
Holland: AEX Index (local currency) BLOOMBERG 
Hong Kong: HKAOl Index (local currency) BLOOMBERG 
Hungary: BUX Index (local currency) BLOOMBERG 
Indonesia: JCI Index (local currency) BLOOMBERG 
Italy: MlB30 Index (local currency) BLOOMBERG 
Japan: TPX Index (local currency) BLOOMBERG 
Korea: KOSPI Index (balanced) (local currency) BLOOMBERG 
Malaysia: KLCl Index (local currency) BLOOMBERG 
Mexico: MEXBOL Index (local currency) BLOOMBERG 
Norway: OBX Index (local currency)  BLOOMBERG 
Peru: ISBVL Index (local currency) BLOOMBERG 
Philippines: PCOMP Index (local currency) BLOOMBERG 
Poland: PWSMWIG Index (local currency) BLOOMBERG 
Russia: ASPGEN Index (local currency) BLOOMBERG 
Singapore: STI Index (local currency) BLOOMBERG 
Spain: MADX Index (local currency) BLOOMBERG 
Sweden: GENX Index (local currency) BLOOMBERG 
Thailand: SET Index (local currency) BLOOMBERG 
Turkey TKSMSCOMP Index (local currency) BLOOMBERG 
UK: IBVC Index (local) BLOOMBERG 
Ukraine: PFTSOTC Index (local currency) BLOOMBERG 
USA: SPX Index (local currency) BLOOMBERG 
Venezuela: IBVC Index (local currency)  BLOOMBERG 
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Overnight Interest Rates 
 
Country Interest rate description Source 
Argentina ARLBPl Index: Buenos Aires Interbank Offer rate Bloomberg 
Brazil BROVERN Code: Brazil Financing Overnight - Middle Rate Datastream 
Canada CCLR Index: Canadian Call Loan rate Bloomberg 
Chile CLREPl D Code: Chile Repo 1 Day- Middle Rate Datastream 
Colombia CBIBKON Code: Colombian Interbank Overnight- Middle Rate Datastream 
Czech Repu. PRIBOVN Index: Czech Interbank Rates, Overnight Bloomberg 
Estonia ETONOIN: Estonian Interbank O/N rate Bloomberg 
Finland FNIWAON Code: Finland Interbank W/A Overnight- Middle Rate Datastream 
France TMP Index: Taux Moyen Pondere Bloomberg 
Germany FD00ON Index: Fibor DEM Zka 11 A.m fixing Bloomberg 
Greece GIBOON Index: Greech Drachma Interbank Deposit Bloomberg 
Holland DGCMR Index: Netherlands Overnight Call Rate : EURO: Bloomberg 
Hong Kong HIBRON Index: Hong Kong Dollar Interbank , Overnight Bloomberg 
Hungary HFDRO/N Index: Hungarian Forint depo Rates Overnight Bloomberg 
Indonesia JINON Index: JAKARTA interbank Offering rate Bloomberg 
Italy RIBORMON Index: Rome Interbank Offer Rate Bloomberg 
Japan JYMU1T Curncy: JPY MUTAN CALL: 1DY Bloomberg 
Korea KWCRlT Curncy: KRW CALL RATE: Overnight Bloomberg 
Malaysia KLIMON Index: Klibor Interbank Offer Rate, Overnight Bloomberg 
Mexico MXRPRP1 Index: Mexican Government Paper Rate (Overnight) Bloomberg 
Norway NOBRON Index: Norway Overnight Lending Rate Bloomberg 
Peru PSDRlT Curncy: PEN DEPOSIT 1DY Peru New Sol Bloomberg 
Philippines PPCALL Index: Philippine Peso Interbank Bloomberg 
Poland WIBOTN: Warsaw Interbank Offer/Bid Rate Bloomberg 
Russia RSBIBK Code: Russian Interbank I day- Middle Rate Datastream 
Singapore SISDON Index: Singapore Dollar Interbank, Overnight Bloomberg 
Spain ESMIBON Code: SPAIN Interbank Overnight Middle Rate Datastream 
Sweden S1BORTN Code: Sweden Interbank Tomorrow/Next Datastream 
Thailand BITBON Index: Bangkok Interbank Offer Rate Bloomberg 
Turkey TUIBON Index: Turkish Interbank Rates, Overnight Bloomberg 
UK BPODR Index: British Pound Overnight Deposit Bloomberg 
Ukraine UIBRON Index: UKRAINE Average Interbank overnight Bloomberg 
USA FEDLO1 Index: Federal Funds Effective Rate Bloomberg 
    Venezuela VENOVER Code: Venezuela Overnight- Middle rate       Datastream 
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Exchange Rates 
 
Country Description Source 
 
Argentina Local currency/US$ Bloomberg 
Brazil Local Currency/US$ Bloomberg 
Canada Local Currency/US$ Bloomberg 
Chile Local Currency/US$ Bloomberg 
Colombia Local Currency/US$ Bloomberg 
Czech Republic Local Currency/US$ Bloomberg 
Estonia Local currency/DM Bloomberg 
Finland Local currency/DM Bloomberg 
France Local currency/DM Bloomberg 
Germany Local Currency/US$ Bloomberg 
Greece Local currency/DM Bloomberg 
Holland Local currency/DM Bloomberg 
Hong Kong Local Currency/US$ Bloomberg 
Hungary Local Currency/US$ Bloomberg 
Indonesia Local Currency/US$ Bloomberg 
Italy Local currency/DM Bloomberg 
Japan Local Currency/US$ Bloomberg 
Korea Local Currency/US$ Bloomberg 
Malaysia Local Currency/US$ Bloomberg 
Mexico Local Currency/US$ Bloomberg 
Norway Local currency/DM Bloomberg 
Peru Local Currency/US$ Bloomberg 
Philippines Local Currency/US$ Bloomberg 
Poland Local Currency/US$ Bloomberg 
Russia Local Currency/US$ Bloomberg 
Singapore Local Currency/US$ Bloomberg 
Spain Local currency/DM Bloomberg 
Sweden Local currency/DM Bloomberg 
Thailand Local Currency/US$ Bloomberg 
Turkey Local currency/DM Bloomberg 
UK Local Currency/US$ Bloomberg 
Ukraine Local Currency/US$ Bloomberg 
Venezuela Local Currency/US$ Bloomberg 
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 Spreads:  Description of government bonds 
 
Government Coupon Maturity Security Source 
Bond Rate Currency Date Type 
 
Argentina 6.8125 USD 0313112005 EMERGING MARKETS Bloomberg 
Brazil 7.00 USD O4llSI2OO9 EMERGING MARKETS Bloomberg 
Bulgaria 6.5 USD 0712812011 EMERGING MARKETS Bloomberg 
Canada    FED 
Chile 6.875 USD 04128/09 GLOBAL Bloomberg 
Colombia 7.25 USD 02123104 YANKEE Bloomberg 
Finland 5.875 USD 02127/06 GLOBAL Bloomberg 
France    FED 
Germany    FED 
Greece 6.75 DM 11/1312006 EURO MTN Bloomberg 
Holland 6.5 EUR 04/15/2003 N-US,INTRNAL DOM Bloomberg 
Hungary 6.5 USD 04/08/2003 EURO-DOLLAR Bloomberg 
Indonesia 7.75 USD 08/01/2006 YANKEE Bloomberg 
Italy 11.5 EUR 03/01/2003 N-US,INTRNAL DOM Bloomberg 
Japan    FED 
Korea 8.875 USD 04/15/2008 GLOBAL Bloomberg 
Malaysia 8.75 USD 06101/09 GLOBAL Bloomberg 
Mexico 6.0675 USD 12131/2019 EMERGING MARKETS Bloomberg 
Norway 8.375 CAD 01/27/03 EURO NON-DOLLAR Bloomberg 
Peru 3.75 USD 03/07/2017 EMERGING MARKETS Bloomberg 
Philippine 6.00USD 06/01/2008 EMERGING MARKETS Bloomberg 
Poland 4.00 USD 10/27/2024 EMERGING MARKETS Bloomberg 
Russia 9.25 USD 11127/2001 EURO-DOLLAR Bloomberg 
Spain 10.5 EUR 10/30/2003 N-US,INTRNAL DOM Bloomberg 
Sweden 5.75 USD 03/26/2001 EURO MTN Bloomberg 
Thailand 7.75 USD 04/15/07 YANKEE Bloomberg 
Turkey 10.00 USD 05/23/2002 EURO-DOLLAR Bloomberg 
UK    FED 
USA 5.875 USD 11115/2005 US GOVERNMENT Bloomberg 
Venezuela 6.875 USD 03131/2007 EMERGING MARKETS Bloomberg 
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   SPREADS  
 
 
 Spreads (continued): Description of corporate Bonds 
 
Source Bonds Name                 Currency Bonds Description 
 
CANADA FED Data  CAD AA corporate- 10 year maturity 
France FED Data  FF AA Corporate- 10 year maturity 
Germany FED Data  DM Mortgage backed- 10 year maturity 
ITALY Bloomberg ELFV2A10 Index ITL Euro Lira Fair Value AA 10 year 
UK FED data   UKP AA Corporate- 10 year maturity 
USA Bloomberg C6A0 12/72  U.S. Corporates, 5-10 Yrs US  Index C6AO ORIGINAL SERIES MLyr 
SPAIN Bloomberg EPFV2A10 Index ESP Euro Peseta Fair Value AA 10 year 
 
 
 
 Appendix Table 1: Construction of spreads 
 
Given availability of data, spreads were either constructed with respect toa corporate bond or with respect to 
government bonds (US or German). Here is a breakdown of spreads used 
  
Countries 
 
Spread Construction 
  
Greece 
 
Spread between Greek government bond and German 
government bond (DM)  
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, UK, 
US, Spain 
 
Spread between local government bonds and respective 
corporate bonds (local currency)  
All other countries 
 
Spread between local government bonds and US 
government bond (US$) 
 
 
 
 
 
